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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 16025

CHARLES ERWIN ALEXANDER,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with aggravated sexual assault
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-405(1) (a) (ii)

(1953,

as amended) .
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried to the Court, the Honorable
Allen B. Sorensen presiding and was found guilty of the
crime charged.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the guilty verdict.
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STATEMENT OJ' THE FACTS
On the afternoon of October 17, 1977, appellant
and a co-defendant, Luther Lee Cook, drove a furniture van
in front of

Union High School and forced a young woman waiting

at the school to enter the van.

(Tr. 12, 13 49, 50).

Appellant was driving the van and proceeded toward Vernal.
Cook warned the girl that if she said anything, he and
appellant would use a knife which appellant was holding in
his hand (Tr. 14, 15).

While driving, Cook put his arm

around the girl and appellant told Cook that he would kill
him if he didn't leave the girl alone.

Cook complied (Tr. 45).

The van eventually turned off onto a dirt road
fourteen to sixteen miles outside of Roosevelt where it
became high-centered (Tr. 16-17).
Appellant, Cook, and the girl left the van and the
girl attempted to escape (Tr. 18).

Cook chased her,

threatened her with a knife and put her in the back of the
van (Tr. 18).

While in the back of the van, the girl heard

Cook threaten appellant (Tr. 18-19),

although Cook denied

making the threat.
Eventually Cook entered the back of the van and
told the girl to undress (Tr. 21-22).

She finally agreed

after Cook again threatened her with the knife (Tr. 22).
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Cook began raping the girl and appellant entered
the van from the front.

He watched briefly and when the

girl continued to struggle, appellant put a screwdriver to
her side, scratched her with it, and told her to stop
fighting and to "move."

(Tr. 22, 23).

The victim couldn't

remember everything that happened, but it is possible that
appellant then attempted to rape her (Tr. 56).
Appellant and Cook left the back of the van and
attempted to free it (Tr. 24).

While appellant and Cook

were digging under the van, appellant became ill, apparently
because of a hypoglycemic reaction and a peptic ulcer
(Tr. 24, 103, 106).
While appellant and the victim were digging out
the van, Cook disappeared (Tr. 24).

The victim asked

appellant to let her go and he finally relented and allowed
her to leave (Tr. 24-25).
Appellant's theory of the case was that Cook
threatened him and forced him to aid in the rape (Tr. 10).
Appellant's testimony, how·ever, established that he
was bigger than Cook (Tr. 95), and other testimony indicated
that appellant likewise threatened Cook (Tr. 45).
The trial court, acting as the finder of fact,
concluded that appellant aided and abetted in the commission
of the aggravated sexual assault and found him guilty.
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Appellant now appeals claiming the Court did
not give sufficient weight to his theory of the case.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION IS
CORRECT AND APPELLANT DID NOT
ACT UNDER COERCION OR THREAT
OF IMMINENT HARM.
Appellant contends that he was forced by Cook to
assist in Cook's rape of the victim and is therefore not
guilty.
§

Appellant bases this argument on Utah Code Ann.

76-2-302

(1953, as amended), which states (inter alia):
(1) A person is not guilty of an
offense when he engaged in the proscribed
conduct because he was coerced to do so
by the use or threatened imminent use of
unlawful physical force upon him or a
third ,person, which force or threatened
force a person of reasonable firmness in
his situation would not have resisted.
(2) The defense of compulsion
provided by this section shall be
unavailable to a person who intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly places himself
in a situation in which it is probable
that he will be subjected to duress.
Appellant suggests that subsection (1) above

posits a subjective test and therefore, because of his
apparent illness, his conduct was reasonable and not
culpable.
This contention is unsupported by the clear
language of the statute and the facts of this case and case
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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First, subsection {1) establishes an objective
test rather than a subjective one.

Naturally, the conduct

of the accused will be viewed under the circumstances as
they existed.

However, the accused's conduct must conform

to that of "a person of reasonable firmness" under these
circumstances.
Any other construction of subsection (1) makes the
above-quoted phrase meaningless, contrary to the standard
rule of statutory construction which assumes legislative
purpose and meaning for every word in a statute.
Therefore, appellant's conduct must be measured
against that of a person of reasonable firmness.

This

construction is supported by a New Mexico case, Esquibel v.
State, 91 N.M. 498, 576 P.2d 1129 (1978).

The Esquibel

Court was asked to construe New Mexico's Duress instruction,
N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 41.20, which states:
Evidence has been presented that
the defendant was forced to
under threats.
If the defendant feared
immediate great bodily harm to himself
or another person if he did not commit
the crime and if a reasonable person
would have acted in the same way under
the circumstances, you must find the
defendant not guilty. The burden is
on the State to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant did not act
under such reasonable fear.
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The New Mexico Supreme Court found that:
Duress and coercion are defenses
to a criminal charge, if the accused
feared immediate great bodily harm
to himself or another person if he
did not commit the crime charged and if
a reasonable person would have acted
the same way under the circumstances.
State v. LeMarr, supra; State v. Lee,
78 N.M. 421, 432 P.2d 265 (Ct.App. 1967),
N.M. U.J.I, Crim. 41.20; Annot., 69
A.L.R. 3d 678 at 684 (1976).
(Emphasis in original).
The questions to be asked under this standard are:
I

(1) was appellant coerced or threatened with the imminent
use of physical force upon himself or the victim to compel his
aid in committing the crimes, and (2) would a person of
reasonable firmness have resisted the threats?
The facts of the case indicate that appellant
failed both parts of the test.

The testimony suggests that

Cook may have verbally threatened appellant several
minutes before the rape (Tr. 18-19, 59).

However, Cook was

smaller than appellant (Tr. 95), and had altered his
behavior earlier because of a threat by appellant (Tr. 45).
Cook entered the back of the van before appellant,
during which time appellant could have secured a weapon,
escaped, or summoned help.

Appellant entered the truck

without coercion and threatened the victim without inducement
from Cook (Tr. 22-23).
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It should be noted that there is a fundamental
difference between Cook's threats to the victim during the
rape which established the prima facie case and his conduct
toward appellant which purportedly activates the compulsion
defense.

The rape was accomplished because of an imminent

threat of violence to the victim (Tr. 21-23).

However,

appellant's aiding and abetting was not the result of threats
to the victim or himself, and is not justified by threats
used to accomplish the rape.
Appellant argues that his hypoglycemia and ulcer
diminished his ability to resist.

The testimony, however,

established that appellant did not become ill until after
the rape (Tr. 24).

The medical testimony did not show or

even suggest any dimination in willpower

pr courage

because of hypoglycemia or peptic ulcer.

Appellant was not

threatened during the course of the rape and the evidence
shows that during the rape Cook was not holding a weapon
(Tr. 35-36).
Cases from other jurisdictions dealing with the
defense of compulsion or duress posit that the threat must
be of imminent and present violence.

Threats of some future

violence or injury are insufficient to invoke the defense.
State v. Milum, 516 P.2d 984

(Kan. 1973); People v. LaCicero,

459 P.2d 241

The facts here do not satisfy

(Calif. 1969).

the requirements of immediacy established by case law.
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Respondent asserts that a person of reasonable
firmness under the circumstances presented by the evidence
would have resisted the compulsion to aid in the commission
of

Indeed, under the circumstances here it

the rape.

appears that appellant could have prevented the rape by
exercising reasonable resistance and yet made no effort to
do so.
The second part of
appellant's position.

§

76-2-302 is also fatal to

Subsection (2) quoted supra states:

(2)
The defense of compulsion
provided by this section shall be
unavailable to a person who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
places himself in a situation in which
it is probable that he will be subjected
to duress.
The evidence indicates that appellant was aware of
Cook's criminal intentions long before the crime occurred
(Tr. 51-54).

After appellant and Cook forced the victim

into the truck, it was apparent that appellant sensed what was
going to occur.

A reasonable person in appellant's

situation should have surmised Cook's intentions a considerablE
time before the crime.
Under subsection (2), therefore, appellant
intentionally and kno~ingly placed himself in a situation
in which it was probable that a crime would occur and
probable that he would be subjected to duress to aid in the
commission of a crime.
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Two recent Federal Circuit Court cases indicate
that where a defendant has opportunity to avoid the
situation in which compulsion will occur, the defense cannot
be asserted.

United States v. Seattle, 585 F.2d 307 (8th

Cir., 1978); United States v. Atencio, 586 F.2d 744 (9th
Cir., 1978).

In the present case, even assuming that the

alleged threats here were authentic and compelling, appellant
had many opportunities to avoid the situation.
have refused to go with Cook to look for girls.

He could
No

testimony was offered that he considered this option.

He

could have driven away when Cook initially confronted the
victim, yet no testimony was offered that he considered
this alternative.

Even after the victim was in the van,

appellant could have taken another route or helped her
escape.

Appellant did not pursue either opportunity.

Thus,

appellant had several chances to totally avoid the situation
in which he was allegedly forced to aid in the rape and yet
willingly continued his involvement.

All of these factors

preclude appellant from asserting the compulsion defense.
Appellant proposes that Chacon v. People, 488 P.2d
56

(Colo. 1971), dealing with self-defense and apparent

necessity should apply to this case.

Such a proposal is

without merit.
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First, the Utah compulsion statute establishes
a requirement of imminent force.

The "appearance of real

danger" theory suggested in Chacon, supra, is inconsistent
with the existence of imminent force.

Respondent concedes

that apparent necessity may be sufficiently compelling when
a person is defending himself, but submits that a higher
standard of necessity is needed when the circumstances
require not only self-protection, but also affirmative
assistance in committing a known felony unrelated to the
act of self-defense.

Respondent suggests that one who

asserts the compulsion defense must do everything reasonably
possible to test the authenticity of a threat of imminent
force before aiding in the commission of a felony.

Appellant

here did nothing to determine whether Cook was actually
willing to fulfil his alleged threat and did nothing to
dissuade Cook from raping the victim.
CONCLUSION
Appellant has failed to meet the requirements
of the compulsion statute, Utah Code Ann.

§

76-2-302.

There

was no showing of threatened imminent use of unlawful
physical force to compell assistance to the commission of
the rape.

The force or threat of forced used to accomplish

the rape does not satisfy the requirement of compulsion to
assist in the rape.

Appellant did not act as a person of
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reasonable firmness would have acted under the circumstances.
The test for determining reasonable firmness is objective,
not subjective.

Appellant's illness wasnotshown to

diminish his will power, courage, resistance, or thinking.
Under the circumstances of the crime and statutes
and case law dealing with compulsion, appellant's defense
must fail.

The Court, acting as trier of fact, properly

found that appellant aided and abetted in the commission of
a rape and that conviction should be affirmed by this Court.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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